

Tweet questions to @SteveSwink / wrap-up room



#### Range of

Success to not-so-success Platforms Market approach Background in indie

Elevate discussion with hard data = from our own businesses, or researched from the internet
Subjective = speculation



We agree this word sucks: Button pushing, reductionist, implies things no one believes in.

Market behavior – slump, downturn, etc.. Talk about these things



# Jeff Vogel

- Spiderweb Software
- President
- ₹ Turn-based, isometric RPGs since 1994
- Over 20 releases
- High profile "Indiepocalypse" blogger



Stretches back to Canabalt








- Question
- **©** Co-owner
- Magic Circle
- Recent addition from mainstream industry
- Former Bioshock



# Randy Smith

- **Tiger Style**
- **©** Co-owner
- oiOS, plus Steam
- Spider: SoBM
- Waking Mars
- Spider: RotSM



So is the Indiepocalypse real?

All read blog posts – indies not making as much money, sometimes MUCH less.

Heard scary tales of games that should have been successful – but weren't

Supply vs demand – supply is going up, demand isn't keeping pace Steam is one of our biggest marketplaces Data credit to steamSpy / Sergey Galyonkin This data - How many games were released each year into Steam

Horseman of the indiepocalypse


Key Greenlight dates -

Aug 30, 2012 = Greenlight launched


Aug 28, 2013 – first time a batch of 100 games was greenlit

Dec 29, 2014 – 268 in 3 days?

No surprise – open the floodgates, more supply in the market




For demand – owners All 86 games released in 2010, if you add up all of their owners, it's 17.1M Due to upward trend probably safe to assume 2015 at least as many owners as 2014



Important disclaimer:

Because of how the steam spy algorithms work: <1000 new owners per month, the margin of error is extremely high

So: lots of noise in this data



Can put both of those sets of data on the same graph, and we can even divide total owners by total games.

The peak is in 2011 with 447k owners per game (but that's just really crude math; there is no mythical average game)

But we do see a general downward trend here

#### CUT:

Compared to 2009:

33x amount of games

12x amount of owners

Compared to 2012:

12x games

2.4x owners

### Size of Steam Market

	Copies	Revenue	Avg. Price	Avg. Discount
All Games	344,729,435	\$3,275,367,197	\$9.41	27.87%
Indie Games	149,489,526	\$1,085,778,462	\$7.79	27.41%

### **steam**spy


- **P** April 2015 Jan 2016 (10 months)
- Sales over 1k / mo. only
- Paid games only

Why we use owners as a metric:

Vale doesn't make public Steam's total sales \$\$\$ per year

But steamspy was recently able to estimate the size of the market, and hot of the presses here for the first time ever, thanks to Sergey the Steam Spy guy, we have some numbers which estimate the size of the indie games market on Steam in particular.


Important disclaimers are listed below – most importantly, because Sergey is more rigorous than I am, no games that accrue less than 1k owners per month are listed, and that includes a lot of indie games. But basically: we see that Valve processes significantly more than ONE BILLION dollars of indie game sales every year and it's right around 1/3 of their overall games market.



Switching to the mobile market This data published by Statista Note: Just APPLE, also NOT indie games, all games Approaching 2M apps in 2015



100Billion downloads by 2015



2011 and 2012 – supply seemed to be growing faster than demand, but catches back up by 2014  $\,$ 


#### CUT:

Compared to 2009
8x amount of games
67x amount of downloads
Compared to 2012
3.3x amount of games
3.2x amount of downloads

"92% of revenue on the App Store is generated by freemium apps, yet they account for just 11% of the apps on the App Store."

- Forbes, Jan 2015

http://www.forbes.com/sites/anthonykosner/2015/01/11/apple-app-store-revenue-surge-and-the-rise-of-the-free mium/3/#1f9950a524f3



Horseman of the indiepocalypse Freemium introduced Oct 15, 2009 Roughly March 2011 = Freemium revenue overtakes Premium revenue



It's really easy to be misleading with data.


Eg – Prior slides don't prove that it's harder to succeed today than it was in 2012.

For example the newcomers to the markets might not be taking away more demand than they are bringing in, eg – hobbyists

We did our best

We didn't research for months.






#### Steam

2009 - ~5.5 per month

2012 – 0.5 indie games per day

2015 – ~6 indie games per day



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
2015 – ~6 indie games per day


#### iOS App Store

2009 – 32 games per day


2012 – 103 games per day

2015 - 494 games per day









First indication was game we released in 2015 was doing much less business than games we released in 2009 and 2012

First 6 months of revenue.

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#### Spider 1

Aug 2009, \$337k iPhone July 2010, \$90k iPad

#### **Waking Mars**

March 2012, \$246k Universal


Dec 2012, \$77k Steam

Nov 2011, \$74k Humble Bundle

#### Spider 2

August 2015 all platforms \$108k iOS

\$11k Steam



Even worse – add lifetime and development time

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LIFETIME NET = as of Feb 21, 2016

Spider iPhone lifetime = \$611k

Spider iPad lifetime = \$169k

Spider1 Humble Bundle lifetime = \$7,793 (Mobile #3 Jan2014)

WM iOS lifetime = \$517k

WM Steam lifetime = \$146k


WM Humble Bundles lifetime = \$74,396 (Android #4, Nov 2012) + \$13,996 (Android

#6, July 2013)

Spider 2 iOS lifetime = \$108k

Spider 2 Steam lifetime = \$14,277 1,480 units

Spider 2 Steam w/ soundtrack lifetime = \$1,652 120 units



(Net Rev-per-person-year over Year)

#### 2009

\$520k

2012 - skip

\$215k

2015

\$13k - not sustainable



So is S1 a better product than S2? Is it...

3.5x = revenue in first 6 months

ROI 40x = revenue per person year of development effort
... and if not, doesn't that imply the market is to blame?



Can't complete with those games.

But at the same time – a game with absolutely no graphics about programming in assembly language was making the kind of money we were used to making, and a choose your own adventure game told with push notification was raking in even more.

Illustrates a big vs small concept I'll get back to later

# Blame Spider 2?

- Apple
  - Not iOS exclusive
- Steam
  - Mobile legacy
  - Bad Steam PR: Coming Soon page ~1 week out,
     Didn't leverage Waking Mars audience



Multiplatform

Less Apple support

Not a good Steam game

Could shake our legacy as a mobile game Didn't play the Steam PR game very well at all

CUT:

No social / word-of-mouth features S1 had Facebook integration

CUT: "Can't win until moon phase / weather" = great soundbite – for expensive feature that adds a lot to the game we worked hard on



Why We Did A Sequel

Less risky

Fans clamoring - base

Assumed a fresh audience - expansion

Press quotes call it a perfect sequel – retained old, expanded nicely.

But, as Armin already alluded

this is an audience that's interested in cool new thing

and even if your design and art and so forth are all but objectively better than the prior game which won a GotY award, these awards are going to go to fresher high concepts

### Indie Market Likes HIGH CONCEPT


- Adding features → Diluted high concept
  - Should have focused on ??
  - JUST mystery
  - JUST gameplay
  - JUST real world time/weather
  - JUST history-hacking ARG-esque thing ??


Ironically by adding more features we were diluting our high concept, audience had to spend more effort to access it.

Might have been better off with a game that's JUST a mystery, or JUST the real world time and weather thing

# Blame Spider 1?

- Released at dawn of App Store
  - Less crowded market
  - No F2P yet
  - App Store growing rapidly
  - HD when iPad released
  - Helped raise mobile gaming standards
  - Made Apple hardware look good
  - "Finally mobile gaming is going to work" -Richard Garriott







Another way to consider this comparison



So what does it mean to be an indiepocalypse retardant game? Here's how I intend to approach this.

Big / small is mostly in terms of production effort: triple-i

Medium - Can't compete arms race against BIG: Expansive, Spectacle, Depth, Long play time

- compared to SMALL games they are expensive and also diluted, small games get right to the crucial high concept more immediately / they are self-evident That said, there's a bunch of perhaps medium sized games that have done very well, so you can think about why they succeeded where Spider 2 did not.



Steam - Long, multi-stage PR campaign Consoles – still curated / limited supply - Mike Rose 2015 IGS presentation

# Multiplatform?

- Not for SMALL games
  - Even if it's "free"
  - Requires tailoring PR, game design, etc..
  - Not simultaneous, anyway.
     Wait until it succeeds
- ♣ App Store → Steam = hard
- Steam → App Store = easier

# New Team Members

- PR
  - Kickstarter, Greenlight,
     Social media,
     Community, Expos, etc..
- **Biz** 
  - Sales, Platform crap,
     Bookkeeping, Watching
     the market


### Publishers?

- ◆ All that
- Discoverability + Funding too



Watch the market- for opportunities and trends

This is part of what it means to treat your dev as a business – even if it's a bummer, even if team only size 2



Is it going to drive in one of these 2 directions?

### We Got What We Wanted

- Open platforms
- Digital distribution
- Cut out the middleman
- Better tools
- Lower barrier to entry
- Better academics
- (And now it's really crowded)

